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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
In 1968, plaintiffs, California residents, were involved in an automo-
bile accident in California. The other vehicle was owned by the State of
Nevada and operated by a University of Nevada employee in the course
of his employment. Plaintiffs brought suit in a California court against the
State of Nevada, the University of Nevada, and the deceased employee's
estate. The trial court quashed service of process upon the State and the
University of Nevada for lack of jurisdiction.' The California Court of
Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Nevada's sovereign immunity precluded
California's jurisdiction over Nevada without its consent. 2 The California
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Nevada's
sovereignty did not extend beyond its own borders and that Nevada was,
therefore, not immune from suit for its activities in other states. 3
On remand, judgment was rendered against Nevada for $1,150,000. 4
The California Court of Appeals affirmed, 5 and the California Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 6 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and held that a state may be sued without its consent in the courts
of a sister state. 7
1. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411-12 (1979). Plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction over the defen-
dants pursuant to California's Nonresident Motorist Statute, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 17451 (West
1971).
2. Hall v. University of Nev., 1 Civ. No. 28689 (Calif. Ct. App. filed May 11, 1972, vacated
Dec. 21, 1972).
3. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972). The
court analogized Nevada's position to that of a state entering a federally regulated field of activity
(see, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)), and to the situation of one state owning
property which is located in another state. See note 8 infra. The court refused to grant immunity as a
matter of comity, citing California's strong policy against sovereign immunity and in favor of com-
pensation of tort victims. 8 Cal. 3d at 525-26, 503 P.2d at 1365-66, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58. The
United States Supreme Court declined to grant a writ of certiorari at that time, 414 U.S. 820 (1973),
and the case was remanded for trial.
For commentary on the California Supreme Court decision, see Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State
Court Jurisdiction over Sister States v. American State Sovereign Immunity, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1144
(1975); Note, Hall v. University of Nevada: Sovereign Immunity and the Transitory Action, 27 ARK.
L. REv. 546 (1973); Note, Sovereign Immunity-May a State Assert In Personam Jurisdiction over a
Sister State Without its Consent?, 53 B.U.L. REv. 736 (1973); Note, Sovereignty of a State Does Not
Extend Into the Territory of Another State so as to Create Immunity From Suit Arising Out of the
Sister State's Activities Within the Boundaries of the Forum State, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 585 (1973).
4. Nevadav. Hall, 440 U.S. at413.
5. Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977). The Court of
Appeals also affirmed the trial court's decision that the full faith and credit clause did not require
California courts to apply Nevada's statutory limitation of liability, which was $25,000 at the time of
the accident. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.035 (1965).
6. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 413.
7. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
Washington Law Review
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity in the courts of another state
and the federal courts will be examined in section I of this casenote. In
section II, the Court's reasoning in Nevada v. Hall will be discussed. The
Court's conclusion that the Constitution places no limit on a state court's
jurisdiction over a sister state will be challenged in part A of section III.
The ambiguities in the Hall opinion that render the scope of a state court's
jurisdiction uncertain and the desirability of limiting that jurisdiction will
be examined in part B of section III. Finally, this note will suggest how
the Court might limit a state court's jurisdiction over a sister state in fu-
ture cases in a manner consistent with Hall.
I. BACKGROUND
Until Nevada v. Hall, it was widely assumed that a state could not be
sued without its consent in the courts of another state. 8 Although rarely
articulated, several theories underlie this claim of immunity. The com-
mon law doctrine of sovereign immunity 9 protects a state from suit in its
own courts, and state courts have extended this immunity to other states
as a matter of comity. 10 A similar privilege existed in the field of interna-
8. See generally 72 AM. JUR. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 99 (1974); 81A C.J.S.
States § 298 (1977); Annot., 81 A.L.R.3d 1239 (1977). An exception to this rule is where a state
owns property situated in another state. The forum state's interest in determining the title and status
of property within its borders justifies the state's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264
U.S. 472, 480-82 (1924). The application of this exception to the present case is discussed in Marti-
niak, supra note 3, at 1147-48; Note, Hall v. University of Nevada: Sovereign Immunity and the
Transitory Action, 27 ARK. L. REv. 546, 549 (1973); Note, Sovereign Immunity-May a State Assert
In Personam Jurisdiction over a Sister State Without its Consent?, 53 B.U.L. REV. 736, 738-39
(1973).
9. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in England as flowing from the
principle that the King was the source of-all justice. The courts derived their authority from the King
and, therefore, had no authority over him without his consent. Only later was this principle articu-
lated into Blackstone's apology that "[t]he King can do no wrong." Pugh, Historical Approach to
the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476 (1953). But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 970-71 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 B, Comment a
(1977). Despite the fact that the American political system (with its balance of powers and egalitarian
principals) differed markedly from England's, the doctrine was early accepted into American law.
Justice Holmes explained the rationale of the doctrine as being basel "on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), cited in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
at 415-16.
10. There are two reported instances where immunity has been granted as a matter of comity.
The Hall Court read Paulus v. South Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924), and Paulus v. South
Dakota II, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1924) as such a case. See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Paulus case. Since the Hall decision, New York has also extended immu-
nity to a sister state as a matter of comity. Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. University of Houston, 69
A.D.2d 75,418 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1979).




tional law."1 In addition, the eleventh amendment12 appeared to provide a
constitutional basis for sovereign immunity and, thus, to foreclose the
possibility that a state could be sued without its consent by a citizen of
another state in any forum. 13 Further, in personam jurisdiction of state
courts was principally confined to the citizens of the state or persons
within its borders; 14 obviously, one state cannot be physically present in
another state.
With the decline of common law sovereign immunity, 15 the emergence
of "restrictive immunity" in international law, 16 and the advent of long-
arm jurisdiction, 17 the traditional barriers to suit in the courts of a sister
state were removed. As states increasingly assumed formerly private ac-
by the courls of one nation to entertain a suit against another in order to promote goodwill and reci-
procity. Comment, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical Analysis, 13 VILL.
L. REV. 583,586 (1968).
11. In The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)(cited by the Hall
Court, 440 U.S. at 416), the Court held that the immunity of a foreign state was not absolute, but was
based upon the forum state's consent. The Schooner Exchange Court, however, found that the United
States had waived its jurisdiction, based upon "the common consent of the nation states and their
coequal dignity." Comment, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical Analysis,
13 ViL. L. Rev. 583, 586 (1968). It was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that the
United States abandoned absolute immunity to international sovereigns in favor of "restrictive immu-
nity." See generally id.; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 417 n. 13.
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI, provides as follows: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
13. See cases cited in 440 U.S. at 437-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714(1877).
15. As tort law became increasingly concerned with compensating the victim and governments
undertook more proprietary activities, critics argued that the government should not hide behind a
defense with "feudal origins." See, e.g., Fox, The King Must Do No Wrong: A Critique of the
Current Status of Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 177 (1979); Weick, Erosion
of State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment by Federal Decisional Law, 10 AKRON L.
REv. 583 (1977). This criticism has been most pronounced in California. In its decision in the Hall
case, the California Supreme Court declared that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be
deemed suspect." Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 526, 503 P.2d at 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
358.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. The traditional basis for personal jurisdiction is the presence of the defendant in the forum
state. See note 14 supra. In more recent years state jurisdiction has been extended through "long-
arm" statutes, such as the nonresident motorist statute used in this case. Assuming that there are
sufficient "minimum contacts" to satisfy the requirement of "due process" under the fourteenth
amendment, see discussion at notes 72 & 74 and accompanying text infra, the long-arm statutes
assert jurisdiction over a corporation or individual that has committed a tortious act or caused harmful
consequences in the forum state. See generally Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Conse-
quences as a Basis of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249 (1959); Comment, The Develop-
ment of lIn Personam Jurisdiction over Individuals and Corporations in California: 1849-1970, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 1105, 1108-10 (1970); Note, Negligent Acts Committed Outside Forum Causing
Harm in Forum as Basis of In Personam Jurisdiction, 46 IOWA L. REv. 868 (1961). For an example
of a "universal long-arm statute," see CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973), quoted in note
69 infra.
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tivites, governmental immunities were widely criticized, and states began
to limit that immunity by statute or judicial decision. 18 It was inevitable
that the state's immunity from suit in the courts of a sister state would also
be brought under scrutiny and that, eventually, the defendant state would
be forced to articulate a more specific source from which the immunity
could be derived. 19
Although the Constitution provides for federal court jurisdiction in
suits "between a State and Citizens of another State," 20 it does not ad-
dress the issue whether state courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
There is little evidence to suggest that this was an issue during the consti-
tutional convention or subsequent ratification debates; most of the atten-
tion was focused on the extent of federal court jurisdiction over a state.2 1
Whatever the founders' intent, in Chisolm v. Georgia22 the Supreme
Court read article III literally and held that a state could be sued in the
federal courts by a citizen of another state. The states reacted quickly by
drafting and ratifying the eleventh amendment, which removed jurisdic-
tion over suits between a state and a citizen of another state from the
federal courts. 23 Although early court decisions broadly interpreted the
amendment to prevent any suit against a state in the federal courts by a
citizen of another state, 24 the more recent trend has been to allow a state
to be sued in the federal courts in certain classes of cases. 25
18. See note 15 supra.
19. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 417 n. 13.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
21. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1-26 (1972). At the
time of ratification, it was widely argued that the federal court jurisdiction granted in article III was
available only in suits where a state was the plaintiff, not the defendant. Later scholars have argued
whether this was an accurate interpretation of an "understanding" that existed at the time of the
Constitutional Convention, or whether Hamilton later adopted this view to appease critics who repre-
sented a renewed interest in states' rights. Id.
22. 2 U.S. (2Dall.)419(1793).
23. See note 12 supra (text of the eleventh amendment).
24. This early rule of construction was described by one author as follows: "The eleventh
amendment is not to be interpreted literally, but according to the 'fundamental rule of jurisprudence'
that 'a state may not be sued without its consent.' "Weick, Erosion of State Sovereign Immunity and
the Eleventh Amendment by Federal Decisional Law, 10 AKRON L. REV. 583 (1977), citing Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). Applying this rule of construction the Court has prohibited
suits against states that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the eleventh amendment. Thus, the Court
has held that the eleventh amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction in suits against a state by the
state's own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); where a state is the real party in interest
though not named as defendant, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945);
and where a state is suing another state in federal court to recover claims assigned to it by its citizens,
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
25. The most noted exception has been under the "implied waiver" doctrine, according to which
a state is said to have waived the eleventh amendment protection by entering into a federally regu-
lated activity. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). This doctrine has been restricted somewhat by Edelman v.
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There are only two previously reported cases in which a state was sued
without its consent in the courts of a sister state. In Nathan v. Virginia,26
plaintiff sought to attach goods in Philadelphia belonging to the State of
Virginia. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the suit without discus-
sion, apparently agreeing with defendant's argument that sovereign
immunity, as applied among sovereign nations, prevented the Pennsylva-
nia courts from entertaining a suit against a sister state without its con-
sent.
In Paulus v. South Dakota,27 the North Dakota Supreme Court refused
to entertain a suit against the State of South Dakota arising from defen-
dant's mining operations in the forum state. While the Paulus court did
not specify the source of South Dakota's immunity, the United States Su-
preme Court in Hall interpreted Paulus to represent a grant of immunity
as a matter of comity, not as an inherent limitation upon the jurisdiction
of the forum state.28
The clear effect of the Paulus decision, however, was to support the
belief that a state could not be sued without its consent in the courts of
another state. The Supreme Court rejected this view in Nevada v. Hall.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which held that state participation in jointly funded programs does not
amount to a waiver of the eleventh amendment immunity. See generally Weick, supra note 24; Com-
ment, Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment: A Survey of Escape Devices, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 625,
635-41 (1977); Note, The Eleventh Amendment: Implied Waiver of State Immunity Re-Examined, 53
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 475 (1976); Comment, Sovereign Immunity: State Liability Under Federal Law
and Limits of the Implied Waiver Doctrine, 9 CONN. L. REv. 247 (1977).
Another, more recent exception to the eleventh amendment immunity has been made for actions
brought under the fourteenth amendment. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Court
held that the eleventh amendment is limited by the fourteenth. See Liberman, State Sovereign Immu-
nity in Suits to Enforce Federal Rights, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 195 (1977); Weick, supra note 23;
Comment, Avoiding the Eleventh Amendment: A Survey ofEscape Devices, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625,
641-44; Note, The Eleventh Amendment and Federally Protected Rights, 27 BUFFALO L. Rev. 57
(1977); Comment, Constitutional Law: Federal Rights and State Immunity-An Unresolved Conflict,
17 WASHBURN L.J. 194 (1977).
26. 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 77 (Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, 1781).
27. 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924); Paulus v. South Dakota II, 58 N.D. 643,227 N.W. 52
(1929).
28. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 417-18 n. 13. The Paulus decision has often been mistakenly
distinguished by the claim that the plaintiff was a South Dakota resident. See Hall v. University of
Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 525, 503 P.2d at 1365, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357; Note, Hall v. University of Nevada:
Sovereign Immunity and the Transitory Action, 27 ARK. L. Rev. 546 (1973); Note, Sovereign Immu-
nity-May a State Assert In Personam Jurisdiction over a Sister State Without Its Consent?, 53
B.U.L. REV. 736, 738-39 (1973); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Sovereignty of a State Does Not Ex-
tend into the Territory of Another State so as to Create Immunity From Suit Arising out of the Sister
State's Activities Within the Boundaries of the Forum State, 6 LOy. L.A.L. REv. 585, 586-87
(1973). These writers were apparently unaware that the case was brought before the Supreme Court
of North Dakota a second time with the plaintiff as a resident of North Dakota. The court there made
it clear that its decision was not dependent upon the plaintiff's residency. Paulus v. South Dakota II,
58 N.D. 643,277 N.W. 52 (1929).
293
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II. THE HALL COURT'S REASONING
In Nevada v. Hall, 29 the Court held that Nevada was subject to suit in
the California courts. Writing for the majority, 30 Justice Stevens began by
noting that the common law doctrine of soverign immunity is not applica-
ble since it applies to suits brought against the sovereign in its own
courts. 31 When the suit is brought in the courts of another sovereign,
Justice Stevens reasoned, the doctrine of international law sovereign
immunity is more appropriate. 32 Quoting from the early case of The
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,33 he found that the forum state's juris-
diction is subject to no limitation by a foreign sovereign and that, hence,
any immunity from suit would have to be based upon the forum state's
consent. 34 Applying this principle to the present case, Justice Stevens
found no such consent. He noted that California had chosen not to extend
immunity as a matter of comity35 and apparently assumed that there was
29. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
30. Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Justices White, Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist wrote separate dissents with Chief Justice
Burger joining in both dissents.
31. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-16. Common law sovereign immunity in England rested
upon the court's subordinance to the King and in America has been justified on the basis of separation
of powers. See note 9 supra.
32. "This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in
its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sov-
ereign's courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sov-
ereign .... " Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 416.
33. 11 U.S. (7Cranch) 116(1812).
34. The Schooner Exchange decision, however, did not stop at that point. Justice Marshall
upheld the French claim of immunity, stating that the forum nation waives jurisdiction when it con-
sents to the passage of another nation over its territory. Furthermore, the waiver of jurisdiction is not
a mere gratuity, but is founded upon the "common consent of the nation states and their coequal
dignity." Comment, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical Analysis, 13
VILL. L. REV. 583, 586 (1968). The Hall Court could have found a similar implied agreement among
states had it chosen to do so. California's internal policy against sovereign immunity is not effective
to rebut the presumption that jurisdiction has been waived. Since a state's internal policy is a substan-
tially different issue from its foreign policy, California's sister states were justified in assuming that
California would still recognize their claim of immunity regardless of its policy in respect to its own
citizens.
It is also important to note that the characterization of international law sovereign immunity as
"comity" may not be applicable to interstate suits. One author suggests that sovereign immunity in
international law is characterized as comity merely because there is no authority to enforce the immu-
nity. Martiniak, supra note 3, at 1151, 1162-63. Once a basis for the immunity is agreed upon, the
Supreme Court could surely enforce the immunity among the states. Furthermore, some dictum sug-
gests that principles of international law have no application to the states. "All the rights of the States
as independent nations were surrendered to the United States. The States are not nations, either as
between themselves or toward foreign nations." New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90
(1883).
35. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 418.
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no express or implied agreement among the states that requires one state
to grant immunity to another. 36 Justice Stevens concluded that unless a
"federal rule" exists that requires the application of sovereign immunity
to the defendant state, "we of course have no power to disturb the judg-
ment of the California courts." ,37
The Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition against a
state being sued in the courts of another state.38 Although article 11I of the
Constitution grants jurisdiction to the federal courts in suits between a
state and a citizen of another state, Justice Stevens denied that this im-
pliedly prohibits the state courts' exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. 39
The Court also concluded that the eleventh amendment limits only the
federal jurisdiction and does not establish a constitutional basis for sover-
eign immunity in the state courts.4°
The Court also discussed whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause re-
quires California to apply Nevada's $25,000 statutory limit to liability. 41
The Court acknowledged that each state must give full faith and credit to
the official acts of other states,42 but held that the clause does not require
California to give extra-territorial effect to Nevada statutes which contra-
vene the legitimate public policy of the forum state. 43
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist wrote separate dissents with Chief
Justice Burger joining in both. The dissenters argued that sovereign
immunity from suits in the courts of another state was an "im-
plied . . . essential component of federalism,"44 whose basis could be
located in the "implicit ordering of relationships within the federal sys-
36. The Court does not discuss whether such an agreement exists, but proceeds as though it does
not. It could, of course, have found an implied agreement based upon common practice among the
states. See note 34 supra.
37. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 418.
38. "These decisions do not answer the question whether the Constitution places any limit on the
exercise of one's State's power to authorize its courts to assert jurisdiction over another State. Nor
does anything in Art. III authorizing the judicial power of the United States, or in the Eleventh
Amendment limitation on that power, provide any basis, explicit or implicit, for this Court to impose
limits on the powers of California exercised in this case." 440 U.S. at 421.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 421-24.
42. Id. at421.
43. Id. at 422-24.
44. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that
the Founding Fathers considered state immunity from suit in the courts of another state a principle so
well settled that they did not feel it necessary to include it in the Constitution. Id. at 431. He also
argued, "[i]f the Framers were indeed concerned lest the States be haled before the federal courts-
as the courts of a' "higher" sovereign,' ante, at 418-how much more must they have reprehended
the notion of a State's being haled before the courts of a sister State." Id. Expanding upon this theme,
Justice Rehnquist stated:
By its terms that Amendment only deprives federal courts of jurisdiction where a State is haled
295
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tem. "45 Justice Rehnquist gave extensive examples from previous Court
opinions where the language strongly suggested that the eleventh amend-
ment barred such suits; 46 he also claimed such suits ran contrary to the
founders' intent since article III was intended to establish a neutral forum
for interstate disputes.47 Justice Blackmun expressed dismay that the
Court was painting with too broad a brush by not restricting California's
jurisdiction to suits arising out of activities in the forum state. 48 Both jus-
tices expressed concern that the Court's decision would reduce contacts
and cooperation among the states. 49
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court was understandably reluctant to limit the jurisdiction of the
into court by citizens of another state or of a foreign country. Yet it is equally clear that the
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the pos-
siblity of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions, for, as Mr. Jus-
tice Blackmun notes, they would have otherwise perversely foreclosed the neutral federal
forums only to be left to defend suits in the courts of other States. The Eleventh Amendment is
thus built on the postulate that States are not, absent their consent, amenable to suit in the courts
of sister States."
440 U.S. at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was referring
to the Court's past efforts to follow the "Constitutional plan" when the Constitution is silent or
ambiguous. One example he gives of such an effort is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
159 (1819), in which the Court upheld the power of Congress to establish a national bank even
though the Constitution was silent on the issue. 440 U.S. at 433-34.
46. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 437-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 434-35.
48. Id. at 427, 428-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was concerned that a state
would be subject to the same liabilities as individuals. "There is no limit to the breadth of the Court's
rationale, which goes beyond the approach taken by the California Court of Appeal in this case....
Indeed, the [California] court said flatly that 'state sovereignty ends at the state boundary. . . .' That
reasoning finds no place in this Court's opinion." Id. at 428 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Hall
v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 284, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439, 441 (1977), which quoted Hall
v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d at 525, 503 P.2d at 1365, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973)).
49. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 429-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and 442-43 (Rehnquist. J..
dissenting). As an example, Justice Blackmun noted that Nevada might withdraw assets (such as
bank accounts) from California so that the plaintiff would be forced to go to the Nevada courts in
order to enforce the judgment. Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Realistically, however, the Hall
decision will not have such a drastic effect on interstate dealings since modem state governments can
hardly operate solely within their borders. The real effect of the Hall decision will be in terms of
increased insurance rates for state activities outside its borders which, in turn, will result in either
higher taxes or less funds for other services. See note 79 infra for a discussion of the political aspects
of a sovereign immunity policy.
There is considerable uncertainty whether the Supreme Court could order the Nevada legislature to
satisfy the judgment. Although the full faith and credit clause requires a state to enforce the valid
judgments of another state, there are some decisions suggesting that a state legislature cannot be
compelled to appropriate funds for a particular purpose. See Martiniak, supra note 3, at 1144,
1162-64 for a discussion of these decisions and how they might apply to the Hall decision.
296
State Sovereign Immunity
California courts. Since the eleventh amendment expressly prohibits fed-
eral court jurisdiction, 50 a denial of the California court's jurisdiction
would have left plaintiffs only the remedy granted by the defendant state
itself.51 Although that result is contrary to the modem trend in the law
relating to sovereign immunity, 52 this note concludes that article I and
the eleventh amendment do prohibit one state's jurisdiction over a sister
state without its consent. Moreover, the Court's opinion is overly vague
and provides little guidance as to the scope of state court jurisdiction over
a sister state in future cases.
A. Constitutional Prohibitions
Justice Stevens' conclusion that article III does not bar concurrent state
jurisdiction ignores the history and purpose of article III. Although article
Ill does not expressly prohibit suits against a state in the courts of another
state, several considerations make it apparent that the founders did not
intend to allow such suits. First, the purpose of article III of the Constitu-
tion was to correct the interstate conflicts that plagued the nation under
the Articles of Confederation by establishing a neutral forum to determin6
interstate disputes. 53 This purpose is manifested in the grant of federal
jurisdiction over controversies "between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-[and] between citizens of different
states. . . .54 If a state were to exercise concurrent jurisdiction in suits
between a state and a citizen of another state, the purpose of providing a
neutral forum would be defeated. 55 Arguably, the states would not have
abolished their only neutral forum in enacting the eleventh amendment
had they anticipated that one state could be held liable in the courts of
another state. 56
50. See note 12 supra (text of the amendment).
51. This remedy is not always a satisfactory one. Besides the considerable expense and incon-
venience of litigating in another state, litigants might find the forum (defendant) state more likely to
apply its own laws and procedural rules, which may not be as beneficial to the plaintiff. In Hall, for
example, the plaintiff's recovery in the Nevada courts would have been limited to $25,000. See note
5 supra.
52. See note 15 supra.
53. See C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 9. See also citation in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 434 n.2
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
55. Some decisions have indicated that article III did not in itself divest state courts of concurrent
jurisdiction. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898) (Louisiana-as a
plaintiff in its own courts in a quiet title action against residents of another state); Tieman v. Mis-
souri-New York World's Fair Comm'n, 48 Misc. 2d 376, 264 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1965) (Missouri as a
defendant in New York courts for injuries to an Illinois resident at Missouri's exhibition at the New
York World's Fair).
56. See note 44 supra.
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Second, it is quite possible that the only reason the founders did not
include an express prohibition against such suits in article III was that the
founders considered the principle too obvious to mention. 57 At the time of
the Convention, such a suit would not have been allowed by the courts of
any state; sovereign immunity was recognized by every state and the in
personam jurisdiction of a state court was confined to its own citizens or
persons physically present in the forum.58 Furthermore, the Nathan v.
Virginia decision had recently determined that a state was protected from
suit in the courts of another state by sovereign immunity.59
Third, the eleventh amendment was intended to preclude suit in any
forum without the consent of the defendant state. The principle was rec-
ognized in New Hampshire v. Louisiana,60 in which the Supreme Court
held that the eleventh amendment could not be circumvented in a suit
brought by one state against another state in federal court to recover
claims assigned to it by its citizens. The Court stated that federal jurisdic-
tion under article III was the exclusive remedy available to a citizen of
another state:
[T]he special remedy, granted to the citizen himself, must be deemed to
have been the only remedy the citizen of one State could have ... against
another State ... except such as the delinquent State saw fit itself to grant.
... It follows that when the [eleventh] amendment took away the special
remedy there was no other left. 6 1
This conclusion is further supported by the theory that the eleventh
amendment was enacted to protect the solvency of state treasuries. 62 The
amendment could achieve this purpose only if it limited the jurisdiction of
every conceivable forum, including that of sister states.
57. The majority opinion stated that "[tihe language used by the Court in cases construing these
limits, like the language used during the debates on ratification of the Constitution, emphasized the
widespread acceptance of the view that a sovereign State is never amenable to suit without its con-
sent." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 420. See also id., at 419 n.16 (comments by Hamilton and
Marshall which evidence a belief that no state would be subject to suit without its consent). This led
Justice Blackmun to voice in his dissent: "The Court's acknowledgement, referred to above, that the
Framers must have assumed the States were immune from suit in the courts of their sister States lends
substantial support. The only reason that this immunity did not receive specific mention is that it was
too obvious to deserve mention." Id. at 430-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 26 and accompanying text supra (discussion of Nathan v. Virginia).
60. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1882). See also cases cited in Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. at 437-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. at 91.
62. See C. JACOBS, supra note 21, at 69. According to this theory, the states were heavily in debt
as a result of the Revolutionary War or were in danger of again becoming heavily in debt if war-
related claims were allowed against the states. Jacobs disputes this theory, stating that at the time the
eleventh amendment was passed the states were in a fairly good financial situation, with the burden of




The Constitution, therefore, does contain an implicit prohibition
against state court jurisdiction over a sister state based upon the history
and purpose of article I and the eleventh amendment. The Hall Court,
nevertheless, held that no such constitutional prohibition exists. Since
that result is contrary to the founders' intent, the remedy sought by the
Court should be carefully circumscribed in order to remedy the perceived
wrong without sacrificing the founders' goals. The Court has thus far
failed to do so.
B. Scope of the State Court Jurisdiction
Even if we accept the Court's conclusions regarding the lack of any
constitutional prohibition, the Hall opinion is ambiguous as to the extent
of state jurisdiction over a sister state. There are several considerations
that might be important to the result in Hall: the plaintiffs were residents
of the forum state, the forum state had waived its own immunity from suit
arising from automobile accidents, and the suit involved an automobile
accident in the forum. The Court's opinion, however, provides little guid-
ance as to whether the Court would allow jurisdiction by-the courts of
another state if any of these facts were different.
The plaintiffs residency will probably not be an important considera-
tion in determining the extent of the forum state's jurisdiction. The Hall
Court did not address this issue, but Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
IndustrialAccident Commission63 provides some guidance. In that case, a
Massachusetts resident sued his Massachusetts employer in the California
courts for an injury he received while working in California. The court
found that California had a substantial interest in the compensation of
those injured within its borders, regardless of the residency of the parties.
If the Pacific Employers Insurance principle were applied to the Hall situ-
ation, forum-shopping would be encouraged since a state could be sued
by its own citizens in the courts of another state, even though such a suit
might be prohibited in the courts of their own state. 64
The Hall Court also left unresolved the question whether the defendant.
state is to be treated as any other nonresident defendant or whether it will
be granted the special protections applicable to the forum state. For exam-
ple, if the forum state's liability were limited by statute to $25,000,
63. 306 U.S. 493 (1939). The Hall court relied on this case in holding that California need not
apply Nevada law under the full faith and credit clause since Nevada's statutory limitation of liability
would contravene California's legitimate public policy of full victim compensation. Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. at 421-24.
64. In Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. v. University of Houston, 69 A.D.2d 75, 418 N.Y.S.2d 81
(1979), the New York court demonstrated the courts' discretionary powers to refuse jurisdiction over
a state on the basis of comity. New York, however, is not prohibited from changing that policy.
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would the defendant state's liability also be limited to the same amount,
or would its liability be the same as any other nonresident litigant? This
was not an issue in Hall since under California law, the state had retained
no monetary limitation upon its liability for automobile accidents.65 The
question will be important in cases where there remains a wide gap be-
tween the amount recoverable against the state and that recoverable
against an individual. 66
The most serious problem concerns the possibility that a state will be
sued for its activities outside the forum state. Although the Court makes
reference to the fact that the suit involved a tortious act in California, 67
the Court's decision does not limit Nevada's liability to suits arising from
activities in the forum state. 68 Without such a limitation, a state may find
itself subject to suit for its activities in third states69 or even within its own
borders. 70 This result could be unfortunate because such suits could inter-
65. See note 5 supra.
66. Where the forum state retains some limits on its own liability, it would be more difficult for
the forum state to refuse to apply the defendant state's limitations of liability under the full faith and
credit clause since the defendant state's limitation is clearly not against the public policy of the forum
state. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 421-24, citing Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145
(1932), and Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
67. See, e.g.. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 424: "In this case, California's interest is the closely
related and equally substantial one of providing 'full protection to those who are injured on its high-
ways .... "' " California ... has adopted as its policy full compensation in its courts for injuries on
its highways resulting from the negligence of others .. "Id. at 426.
68. "There is no limit to the breadth of the Court's rationale, which goes beyond the approach
taken by the California Court of Appeal in this case. . . .Indeed, the [California] court said flatly
that 'state sovereignty ends at the state boundary'.... That reasoning finds no place in this Court's
opinion." Id. at 428 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Thus, a state may well find itself in the same position as the defendant in Cornelison v.
Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976), where a California resident sued a
Nebraska trucker in the California courts over an accident that occurred in Nevada. The court found
sufficient "minimum contacts" in the fact that the defendant had driven trucks through the state in
recent years, had a California license on his truck, and was carrying a load to California when the
accident occurred. The court concluded that California was not an "inconvenient forum" since the
accident occurred not far from the California border and a witness (the plaintiff) resided in California.
The court's jurisdiction was based upon a statute which provides, "[a] court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
70. Cf. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976). In that case a California resident became intoxicated in a Nevada
nightclub and was subsequently involved in an automobile accident in California. The California
Supreme Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the defendant club since the club solicited
customers in California who could be expected to use California highways. Id. at 322, 546 P.2d at
725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The court held that the defendant club could be held liable under Califor-
nia's judicially created "Dram Shop" doctrine, despite the fact that Nevada had expressly rejected
the doctrine and defendant's conduct could result in no civil liability in the Nevada courts. Id. at 317,
546 P.2d at 721, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217. Applying a "governmental interest" choice of law analysis,
the court reached the conclusion that California had an "important and abiding interest" in having its
rule applied to Nevada establishments and that California's policy would be "more significantly im-
paired" if the rule were not applied. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
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fere with the sovereignty and policies of both the defendant state and the
state where the activities occurred. 71
Without special limitations, the forum state may exercise jurisdiction
over any state having sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum
state to render the exercise of jurisdiction "substantially fair. '"72 The
"minimum contacts" rule fails to limit effectively the forum state's juris-
diction since most states engage in considerable interstate contacts with
their neighbors. 73
Such an extensive grant of jurisdiction over other states threatens to
interfere with the legitimate policies of those states and, hence, to intrude
upon their sovereignty. For example, Arizona might wish to encourage
interstate commerce with Nevada by extending immunity to Nevada as a
matter of comity. Should an agent of Nevada become involved in a colli-
sion in Arizona, jurisdiction by the California courts74 would frustrate the
policy by discouraging Nevada from sending its agents anywhere outside
its borders. 75 In cases where the suit involves the defendant state's con-
duct within its own borders, the jurisdiction creates an even greater intru-
sion upon the sovereignty of the defendant state. Not only is the forum
71. See notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text infra.
72. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
73. If a defendant's contacts are so significant that he has availed himself of the privileges of the
forum state, the defendant may be subject to the "general jurisdiction" of the state and subject to suit
over any activities, whether or not the action is related to the contacts that establish the court's juris-
diction over the defendant. As the quality and frequency of those contacts decline, the jurisdiction
over the defendant must be more closely confined to the conduct that establishes jurisdiction over the
defendant. Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143,545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
It is also clear that the defendant does not actually have to "enter" the forum state to establish
sufficient minimum contacts. A defendant may be held liable when his acts in one state create "con-
sequences" in the forum state. For example, in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 71 Cal. 2d 898, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969), the basis of jurisdiction rested solely
on the fact that the defendant should have been able to foresee that one of its products might enter the
forum state and cause an injury there. See also Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Conse-
quences as Bases for Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. Rv. 249, 260-64 (1959); Note, Negligent
Acts Committed Outside the Forum Causing Harm in Forum as Basis of In Personam Jurisdiction, 46
IoWA L. REv. 868 (1961). Even the limited protections offered by the "minimum contacts" rule may
not apply to the states as defendants. The "minimum contacts" rule is based upon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and prior cases have held that a state is not a "person" protected
by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Scott v. Frazier, 258 F. 669 (N.D. 1919), rev'd on other
grounds, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wis. 1962); El
Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 133 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Tex.
1955), rev'd in part on other grounds and aff 'd in part, 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 355
U.S. 820 (1957); Warren County, Miss. v. Hester, 219 La. 763, 54 So. 2d 12 (1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 877 (1951); State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n v. Taira, 78 N.M. 276,430
P.2d 773 (1967).
74. Jurisdiction over the defendant state could be had in the same manner the California courts
asserted jurisdiction in Cornelison v. Chaney, discussed in note 69 supra.
75. See notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the effects of a state's public
policy regarding sovereign immunity).
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state substituting its own policy of sovereign immunity for that of the
defendant state, 76 but in so doing the forum state is regulating the defen-
dant state's conduct within its own borders. 77 Although it is quite possible
that conflicts such as these might be avoided through the neutral applica-
tion of conflict of laws principles, the modern trend is to leave consider-
able latitude to the forum state's courts to apply forum law. 78
76. Modem sovereign immunity is not necessarily a blind reliance on feudal concepts (see note
15 supra), but a political decision reflecting a rational balance between the need to secure victim
compensation and the state's ability to provide government services. Alstyne, Governmental Tort
Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 463 (1963); Fox, The King Must Do No
Wrong: A Critique of the Current Status of Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 177
(1979). Increased tort liability affects that balance by forcing the state either to divert funds from
government services or to raise taxes to pay for increased insurance and judgment costs. States with a
small tax base and a greater demand for basic social services might well be justified in preserving
limits on state liability. The courts should exercise a good deal of caution before they allow a substi-
tution of the balance struck by the forum state for that of the defendant state.
77. The specter of one state regulating the affairs of another within its own borders is precisely
the reason that the result in Hall was so attractive. It ran contrary to many persons' sense of equity
and justice to restrict a California resident's recovery for an accident in his own state because of
another state's policies. This was set forth by the Court at the end of the opinion: "[11f a federal court
were to hold . . . that California is not free in this case to enforce its policy of full compensation,
that holding would constitute the real intrusion of the sovereignty of the States .. " Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. at 426-27. This principle is also stated in a portion of The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812), which was quoted by the Court:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitations not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity
from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restric-
tion, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which would impose
such restriction.
Cited in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 416. A suit involving a defendant state's activities within its
own borders, however, creates no less an intrusion upon the sovereignty of the defendant state. Fur-
thermore, the forum state may have few sovereign interests at stake when the suit involves activities
outside its borders, especially compared with the resulting intrusion upon the defendant state.
78. States are generally free to make their own determinations as to choice of law within certain
constitutional limits. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 12 (3d ed. 1977). With the withdrawal
of the Supreme Court from the "rule-making" function in the conflict of laws area, id. at 105, and
the modem trend away from strict rules and toward the "most significant relationship" or "govern-
ment interest" analysis, id. at 182-86, state courts are left with wide latitude to determine which is
the proper law to apply to a given case. This has led to a marked preference for courts to choose the
laws of the forum over those of a competing state. "Modem courts and scholars recognize that the
dominance of the forum court in the choice-of-law process inevitably produces a tendency to prefer
the forum's own law above the law of any other state." Id. at 6.
The idea that the forum's own law is the best in the world is not uncommon among judges. It is
altogether possible that a court may conclude, after intelligent comparison, that its local rules are
wiser, sounder, and better calculated to serve the total ends of justice under law in the contro-
versy before it than are the competing rules of the other states that are involved in the case.
Id. at 182.
The constitutional limits referred to above cast the "outer limits" of a state court's discretion to
determine which state's law should be applied to a given case. Based primarily on the full faith and




C. Limitation of State Court Juridsiction
The Court's opinion is not clear as to whether a state court's jurisdic-
tion over a sister state could be limited and, if limited, whether it would
be consistent with the Hall opinion. The Court's only reference to future
limitations was confined to a brief footnote:
California's exercise ofjurisdiction in this case poses no substantial threat to
our constitutional system of cooperative federalism. Suits involving traffic
accidents occurring outside Nevada could hardly interfere with Nevada's
capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities. We have no occasion,
in this case, to consider whether different state policies, either of California
or of Nevada, might require a different analysis or a different result. 79
The thrust of the footnote is that the Court will reserve the option of limit-
ing jurisdiction in future cases. The Court, however, provides no clues as
to what policies it refers to or how it might reach a different result.80
The footnote appears at first glance to be inconsistent with the thrust of
the Hall opinion. In Hall, the Court held that there are no constitutional
prohibitions against state jurisdiction over a sister state. Since the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment offers little or no protection
to the states, 81 the Court would be hard pressed in future cases to discover
an effective constitutional provision not disposed of in Hall.82
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in question, the
forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved, could constitutionally
apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the
multistate activity.
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962), cited in R. LEFL.AR, AMERICAN CONVICTs LAW 105
(3d ed. 1977). In addition, the "contravention of public policy" exception to the full faith and credit
clause applied by the Court in Hall leaves little room for a state court to transgress these limits so long
as there is a rational basis for applying the forum state's law. See text accompanying notes 41-43
supra. See generally R. LEaHAR, AME tcAN CoNFuCrs LAw 105-23 (3d ed. 1977); R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ONTHE CoNFLICTOF LAWS (2d ed. 1980).
79. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 424 n.24. The Court's reference to "cooperative federalism" is
a response to the argument that states will attempt to reduce their interstate contacts in order to avoid
establishing "minimum contacts," or simply lessen the risk of liability outside its borders. See id. at
429-30, 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As a practical matter, it is unlikely that these states will
retreat within their own borders; instead, they will simply purchase more insurance. This, of course,
requires either higher taxes or reduced government services.
80. The footnote might suggest that the Court would allow suits arising from activities in the
forum state or third states, but not those arising from activities within the defendant state itself. The
Court's reference, however, is sufficiently vague to leave the question open.
81. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
82. The Court stated that neither article III, the eleventh amendment, nor the Full Faith and
Credit Clause prohibited suits against a state in the courts of a sister state. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
at 421, 424. The Court also stated that "unless such a federal rule exists, we of course have no power
to disturb the judgment of the California courts." Id. at 418. One option that might be available to the
Court is to limit the choice-of-law options available to a state court when the defendant is a state and
the suit involves a state's activities within its own borders. This could be accomplished under the Full
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One solution to this problem might be found through the use of a "gov-
ernment interest" analysis such as that used in the conflict of laws field. 83
Where the suit involves the defendant state's activities within the forum
state, it is clear that the forum state's interest in regulating conduct within
its borders is superior to the defendant state's interest in retraining its
immunity. 84 However, where a suit involves the defendant state's activi-
ties outside the borders of the forum state, this police power is not at
stake. 85 The additional harm imposed upon the defendant state's sover-
eignty 86 (or that of the state where the activity occured) 87 may justify a
limitation upon either the jurisdiction of the forum state or its discretion to
determine which law it will apply. 88
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Nevada v. Hall it was widely assumed that a state could not be
sued without its consent in the courts of another state. In Hall the Court
held, in effect, that no such immunity exists between states. The Hall
decision leaves a number of issues unsettled, the most troubling of which
is the prospect of one state passing judgment upon the activities of a de-
fendant state within its own borders. The jurisdiction of the state courts in
such cases should be limited to that which is necessary to preserve the
sovereignty of the forum state without creating an undue infringement
upon that of the defendant state.
Faith and Credit Clause. The Court in Hall held that California is not required to apply Nevada law to
activities occurring in California when the Nevada law would contravene California's legitimate pub-
lic policy. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra. This does not preclude the court from finding
otherwise when the suit involves a state's activities within its own borders. But see Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (California may apply its own Work-
men's Compensation law to an employee injured in Alaska while employed under a contract made in
California with California employers). This method of resolving the conflict would require the Court
to depart from its modern trend toward "states rights" in regard to choice of law decisions. R. LE-
FLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 105, 116-20 (3d ed. 1977).
83. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 185-89 (3d ed. 1977).
84. See note 77 supra.
85. This is not to say that an exception should not be allowed where the defendant state's negli-
gent acts within its borders results in substantial foreseeable harm in a neighboring state. For exam-
ple, one state might negligently maintain a dam and reservoir which eventually results in the dam
bursting and flooding areas in a neighboring state. This author, however, leaves to others the task
detailing the limits of such an exception.
86. See notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 74 & 75 supra.
88. It is uncertain whether this rule would be observed by state courts of their own volition,
especially where the refusal to grant jurisdiction or the application of another state's laws would
result in a bar to or limitation upon the plaintiff's recovery. See note 78 supra. Although the Supreme
Court could enforce such a distinction through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this would require a
departure from the Court's trend away from the creation of constitutional choice of law determina-
tions. See note 82 supra.
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Despite its defects, the Hall decision will provide welcome relief to
plaintiffs injured within their own state by the conduct of another state.
Whether this jurisdiction will be limited to the purpose for which it was
recognized can be answered only in future decisions.
Richard H. Pierson
